Lost in Translation?: The Disability Perspective in Honda v. Keays and Hydro-Quebec v. Syndicat by Mosoff, Judith
The Peter A. Allard School of Law
Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications (Emeriti)
2009
Lost in Translation?: The Disability Perspective in
Honda v. Keays and Hydro-Quebec v. Syndicat
Judith Mosoff
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, mosoff@allard.ubc.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.allard.ubc.ca/emeritus_pubs
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications
(Emeriti) by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons.
Citation Details
Judith Mosoff, "Lost in Translation?: The Disability Perspective in Honda v. Keays and Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat" (2009) 3:1 McGill JL
& Health 137-149.
  
LOST IN TRANSLATION?: THE DISABILITY PERSPECTIVE 
IN HONDA V. KEAYS AND HYDRO-QUÉBEC V. SYNDICAT  
Judith Mosoff* 
Two recent decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada, Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays and Hydro-Québec v. 
Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec raise concerns about the 
extent of human rights protections for employees with disabilities. In this comment the author argues that when 
disabilities do not fit neatly into a standard medical framework such as the conditions of chronic fatigue syn-
drome or mental illness, there is a tendency to disbelieve the employee, not take the individual seriously, or set 
out special regimes for confirmation. With a focus on the employment contract rather than discrimination, the 
author argues that an analysis of human rights obligations was virtually absent in the employment law context. 
In the labour law context, the Court gave no real guidance about the meaning of undue hardship. The author 
suggests that these cases do not reflect the broad vision of an inclusive workplace previously set out in Meiorin. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nearly ten years ago, in Meiorin,1 the Supreme Court of Canada set the gold standard for under-
standing human rights obligations in the workplace. In Meiorin, the Court described the importance of 
human rights law to promote inclusion and to address systemic discrimination in employment. The 
Court held that a fitness standard for forest firefighters, developed in a male dominated work environ-
ment, discriminated against women. In addition, it provided employers with a rough operational defi-
nition for the duty to accommodate.2 To claim that the duty to accommodate had been met, an em-
ployer would have to demonstrate that further accommodation was “impossible” without imposing un-
due hardship on the enterprise.3  
Thus, over the last decade, employers have been bound by an extensive duty to accommodate em-
ployees who were protected by human rights law. However, the two cases that are the subject of this 
comment, Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays4 and Hydro-Québec5, call into question the expansive vision of 
human rights where employees with disabilities are concerned.  
While the heart of the Meiorin decision was the recognition of the importance of legal rules to 
promote an inclusionary workforce, the present cases raise questions about how far an employer needs 
to go to accommodate employees with disabilities. Statistics on labour force participation by people 
with disabilities are revealing. According to a recent Statistics Canada report, for those between the 
ages of 25 and 54, the prime working age range, 49.7% of people with disabilities were working com-
pared to 83.5% of the non-disabled population.6 People with mental disabilities fared particularly bad-
ly. Of Canadians with psychological illnesses, 45.2% participated in the workforce while only 32.7% of 
persons with developmental disabilities participated in the workforce.7 In 2001, just 40% of women 
aged 15 to 64 with disabilities were part of the Canadian work force compared to 69% of women in this 
age range without disabilities.8 Given the significance of employment in our society, for reasons of eco-
nomic security, social recognition and feelings of self worth, the extent of an employer’s obligation to 
accommodate is a pressing question for people with disabilities. 
Both Honda and Hydro-Québec involved employees who were fired because of absenteeism that 
stemmed from their disabilities. Mr. Keays had chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) while Ms. Laverrière 
had a variety of physical problems as well as several psychiatric diagnoses including personality disor-
der. Mr. Keays sued Honda for wrongful dismissal when he was fired because he refused to see another 
doctor about his condition. Ms. Laverrière filed a grievance under a collective agreement after she lost 
her job following a long period of disability-related absenteeism. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of 
Canada found that neither employer had discriminated against their respective employee.  
In my view, both decisions stray from the view of human rights in the workplace that envisions a 
broad application of human rights principles for the purpose of encouraging an inclusionary workforce. 
                                                 
 1 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service 
Employees’ Union (B.C.G.S.E.U.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, [1999] S.C.J. No. 46 [Meiorin cited to S.C.R.]. 
 2 The extent of the obligation to accommodate people with disabilities in important public activities was reiterated 
soon after in the context of eligibility criteria for driving tests. See British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. 
British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868, [1999] S.C.J. No. 78, 181 D.L.R. (4th) 385. 
 3 Meiorin, supra note 1 at para. 54. 
 4 Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays, 2008 SCC 39, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 362, [2008] S.C.J. No. 40. [Honda]. 
 5 Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section 
locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ), 2008 SCC 43, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 561, S.C.J. No. 44 [Hydro-Québec]. 
 6 Human Resources and Social Development Canada, Advancing the Inclusion of People with Disabilities (2006) (Ot-
tawa: Human Resources and Social Development Canada, 2006) at 92, online: Human Resources and Skills Development 
Canada <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/disability_issues/reports/fdr/2006/advancinginclusion.pdf>. 
 7 Statistics Canada, Participation and Activity Limitation Survey 2006: Labour Force Experience of People with Dis-
abilities in Canada, Catalogue No. 89-628-X (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2008) at 10, online: Government of Canada: 
Depository Services Program <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2008/statcan/89-628-X/89-628-XIE2008007.pdf> 
[PALS 2006]. 
 8 Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Gender-based Statistical Report, 5th ed., Catalogue no. 89-503-XIE (Ottawa: 
Minister of Industry, 2006) at 294, online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-503-x/89-503-x2005001-
eng.pdf>. 
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In this comment, I will develop two themes in the decisions which have contributed to an apparent re-
treat from the Meiorin analysis. First, the type of disability of both Mr. Keays and Ms. Laverrière was 
considered to be outside of the norm, not easily confirmed or explained by standard medical analysis. 
Often, people with some conditions, such as CFS or mental illness, are simply not believed or not taken 
seriously. They are frequently subjected to endless medical scrutiny to legitimate their disability. With 
certain conditions, such as personality disorder, which is disabling only in a social environment, medi-
cine can offer neither definitive diagnosis nor effective treatment. The second theme concerns the ways 
that human rights principles are applied to issues of employment law and labour law in these cases. 
Although there seems to have been an obvious disability discrimination issue in both cases, the deci-
sions did not rely on human rights law as paramount. The Court was not primarily concerned with the 
duty to accommodate and undue hardship. Rather, the decisions focused on the principles of contract 
law and the technical rules about damages. Human rights became quite secondary. 
This comment is divided into 4 sections. In Section I, I will give a brief description of the facts and 
the judicial history of each case. In Section II, I will move on to an analysis of two themes in the deci-
sions: first, the significance of the controversial nature of the disabilities involved and second, the un-
certainty about the meaning of the duty to accommodate and undue hardship in the context of em-
ployment and labour law. Finally I will draw some concluding observations about the discrepancy of 
these cases with the Meiroin analysis.  
I 
DESCRIPTION OF THE CASES 
A. Keays and Honda Canada 
In March 2000, Kevin Keays was fired from Honda Canada after working for the company for 14 
years. In 1997, he was diagnosed with chronic fatigue syndrome. For the following year he did not 
work and received insurance benefits from an insurer, London Life. After one year, London Life 
stopped paying his benefits on the basis of a medical opinion that he was fit to return to work full-
time.  
Mr. Keays’ return to work was not smooth. He was placed in Honda’s Disability Program which 
allowed employees absences if they were confirmed as disability-related. Unlike the protocol for oth-
er conditions, Mr. Keays was required to provide a doctor’s note to confirm that every absence was 
related to his non-“mainstream” disability, a term first used by the trial judge.9 Despite the many 
notes, Honda became concerned that the doctors were not evaluating Mr. Keays’ absences independ-
ently but were simply repeating his own explanations for being off work. To confirm Keays’ diagno-
sis, Honda requested that he see Dr. Brennan, a company doctor. On the advice of his lawyer, Mr. 
Keays requested more information about the proposed consultation before he would agree to attend. 
On March 28, Honda replied with an ultimatum: either Mr. Keays would meet with Dr. Brennan, or 
he would be dismissed. Mr. Keays did not see Dr. Brennan and was dismissed. He sued for wrongful 
dismissal. 
At trial, McIsaac J. found that Mr. Keays was wrongfully dismissed because Honda’s direction to 
see Dr. Brennan was not reasonable in the circumstances and Mr. Keays had a reasonable excuse for 
resisting. McIsaac J. concluded that Mr. Keays should have been given 15 months notice but ex-
tended this to 24 months because of the bad faith associated with the manner of the dismissal and 
the medical consequences that ensued for Mr. Keays. The trial judge awarded $500,000 in punitive 
damages against Honda because of its discriminatory and harassing treatment of Mr. Keays. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by Honda. Goudge J.A. wrote for the Court ex-
cept on the quantum of punitive damages. He was reluctant to interfere with the findings of the trial 
judge in a case so heavily laden with facts. On the issue of the availability of punitive damages, 
Goudge J.A. held that discrimination may constitute an independent actionable wrong giving rise to 
                                                 
 9 Keays v. Honda Canada Inc., [2005] O.J. No. 1145, 40 C.C.E.L. (3d) 258 at para. 7 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Honda trial cited to 
O.J.]. 
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punitive damages. Writing only for himself, Goudge J.A. would have upheld the award of the trial 
judge of $500,000. Rosenberg J.A., who wrote for the majority on the quantum of punitive damages, 
did not agree that there was evidence of a protracted conspiracy to warrant such a high award. The 
majority, therefore, set punitive damages at $100,000.  
At the Supreme Court of Canada, Bastarache J. (McLachlin C.J., Binnie, Deschamps, Abella, 
Charron, Rothstein J.J. concurring) wrote for the majority. LeBel and Fish J.J. dissented in part. The 
Court upheld the decision that Mr. Keays had been wrongfully dismissed and agreed with the 15 
month notice period set at trial. The Court was unanimous in setting aside the punitive damages 
award but differed on damages for the manner of dismissal. Unlike the majority, the dissenting jus-
tices would have upheld the damages for the manner of dismissal. 
The majority found an extraordinary number of errors in the findings of fact by the trial judge. 
One of the most significant errors, according to the majority, was the finding that Honda had en-
gaged in a corporate conspiracy. Other errors included a finding that Dr. Brennan had already con-
cluded that Mr. Keays’ condition was “bogus”,10 that Dr. Brennan took a “hardball”11 attitude, and 
that Honda’s cancellation of accommodation was a reprisal for Keays retaining legal counsel.12 Based 
on the majority’s findings, there was no longer any evidence of bad faith in the manner of Keays’ 
dismissal and thus no damage award based on the conduct of the dismissal.  
In its analysis of the case’s human rights dimension, the majority did not find evidence of dis-
crimination.13 Like the courts below, the majority referred to its previous decision in Bhadauria14 
that established that a breach of human rights legislation could not constitute a distinct tort.15 Fur-
thermore, despite its decision in McKinley v. BC Tel,16 the majority seemed to be of the view that dis-
crimination could not be “an independent actionable wrong” on which a punitive damages award 
could rest.17  
LeBel J., writing in dissent, began by emphasizing that a review of damages for the breach of an 
employment contract must be informed by the values of human rights codes and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.18 While the dissent agreed with the majority that there was no ba-
sis for punitive damages, it held that it was appropriate for the trial judge to award damages for 
manner of dismissal because it was done in bad faith and in a discriminatory manner. Unlike the ma-
jority, the dissent found very few errors in the findings of fact at trial. 
B. Ms. Laverrière, Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-
Québec and Hydro-Québec 
During her last seven and a half years working for Hydro-Québec, Ms. Laverrière missed 960 days 
of work. She had a number of physical and mental disabilities including tendonitis, epicondylitis, hy-
perthyroidism, hypertension as well as episodes of reactive depression and mixed personality disorder 
with borderline and dependent character traits. One of Ms. Laverrière’s main disability-related difficul-
ties was her relationships with supervisors and co-workers. During the period of her employment, Hy-
dro-Québec tried to respond to Ms. Laverrière’s difficulties by giving her light duties, a gradual return 
to work after a period of depression and, eventually, a new position to which, according to the union, 
she was not entitled. When she was dismissed, Ms. Laverrière had not been to work for 5 months. 
                                                 
 10 Honda, supra note 4 at para. 43. 
 11 Ibid. at para. 46. 
 12 Ibid. at para. 47.  
 13 Ibid. at para. 67. 
 14 Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181 [Bhadauria]. 
 15 Honda, supra note 4 at para. 67. 
 16 McKinley v. BC Tel, 2001 SCC 38, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 161, S.C.J. No. 40 at para. 89 (case involving the dismissal of a 
chartered accountant with hypertension, a unanimous court mentioned in obiter that discrimination may give rise to a puni-
tive damages award). 
 17 Honda, supra note 4 at para. 64. See also Vorvis v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085. 
 18 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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Medical reports suggested that she would continue to be absent as she had in the past. The complain-
ant grieved the dismissal as unjust. 
The arbitrator dismissed the grievance on the basis that the employer could terminate the contract 
if the complainant was unable, “for the reasonably foreseeable future, to work steadily and regularly as 
provided for in the contract.”19 The Union’s expert evidence stated that improvement was possible if all 
stressors could be removed from Ms. Laverrière’s environment. This would mean completely changing 
her work environment and eliminating the stresses within her family. According to the arbitrator, this 
would require the employer to provide the complainant, periodically and repeatedly, with a completely 
new working environment including a new supervisor and coworkers. According to the arbitrator, this 
level of accommodation would constitute undue hardship.  
On judicial review in the Quebec Superior Court, Matteau J. upheld the arbitrator’s decision. Mat-
teau J. did not agree with the Union’s submission that the employer had to show that Ms. Laverrière’s 
absences had “insurmountable consequences”.20 The Quebec Court of Appeal took a different view. 
From its perspective, in order to follow the approach set out in Meiorin, to claim undue hardship the 
employer had to prove that it was impossible to accommodate the employee’s characteristics. 
At the Supreme Court of Canada, Deschamps J. wrote for a unanimous Court and dealt with the 
meaning of the term “impossible” as it was set out in Meiorin. The question was not whether it was im-
possible to accommodate the employee but, more specifically, whether it was impossible to accommo-
date the employee without causing the employer undue hardship. Undue hardship involved the ques-
tions of whether the employer’s operation was excessively hampered or whether the employee was un-
able to work for the foreseeable future, despite the employer’s attempts to accommodate. The basic ob-
ligation of the employment contract, being the exchange of labour for wages, however, remains intact. 
Hydro-Québec had no obligation to alter the employment relationship in a fundamental way. It was, 
therefore, Ms. Laverrière’s breach of the employment contract that justified her dismissal. 
II 
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS 
 A. The Nature of the Disability Effects the Legal Outcome 
In this section, I will argue that the nature of the particular disabilities of Mr. Keays and Ms. Laver-
rière was an important factor in the legal outcome. Underpinned by a medical model of disability, the 
Court’s perception of certain disabilities as “non-mainstream” reflects a disability hierarchy with respect 
to legitimacy. Disabilities that are poorly understood, or do not fit neatly into a medical model, are con-
sidered less legitimate than others. In previous equality and human rights cases, the Court has often rec-
ognized the particular difficulties faced by people with controversial disabilities. This was not recognized 
in the current cases. Rather, attitudes about the particular nature of these disabilities set the stage for the 
Court to minimize the human rights obligations of employers to accommodate the disabilities of these 
employees. 
1. Disability as “Non-Mainstream”: A Hierarchy of Legitimacy 
The disabilities of both Mr. Keays and Ms. Laverrière were considered outside the norm or not 
“mainstream”. This is not because CFS or mental illness is uncommon. To the contrary, the preva-
lence of these conditions is very high, with considerably higher rates in women.21 According to the 
                                                 
 19 Hydro-Québec, supra note 5 at para. 5. 
 20 Ibid. at para. 7 quoting from Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, 
section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ) c. Corbeil, [2004] J.Q. no 11048 at para. 52 (QL) [translation by the Supreme Court of Can-
ada]. 
 21 Jungwee Park & Sarah Knudson, “Medically unexplained physical symptoms” (2007) 18:1 Health Reports 43. (Ac-
cording to a Statistics Canada study, entitled Medically Unexplained Physical Symptoms, in 2003 it was estimated that 341 
000 Canadians aged 12 or older, approximately 1.3% of the national population, had chronic fatigue syndrome. Approxi-
mately 69% of these individuals were women).  
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Department of Health and Human Services: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention webpage, a 
source cited in the Honda trial judgment,22 more than one million Americans have CFS.23 This 
makes the incidence of CFS higher than that of multiple sclerosis, lupus, lung cancer, or ovarian can-
cer. According to this same source, CFS occurs four times more often in women than in men.24 In 
2002, Statistics Canada estimated that 2,600,000 Canadians, or 10.4% of the national population, 
had a mental illness or substance dependency, the majority of them women.25 
The Court’s description in Honda of certain disabilities as “non-mainstream” is problematic. If 
this term does not refer to numbers, what does it mean? Probably it suggests that a condition is in-
consistent with a medical model of disability and is, therefore, questionable. A medical model views 
disability as individual pathology or deficiency where medical tests, doctors and other health profes-
sionals establish legitimacy. Neither CFS nor mental illness, especially personality disorder, fit well 
in a medical model of disability. This likely influenced the Court’s view of the disabilities of Mr. 
Keays and Ms. Laverrière as not particularly compelling, legitimate, or comprehensible.  
When the Ontario Superior Court of Justice first differentiated  “mainstream” illnesses from 
conditions like CFS in Honda trial, it seemed to refer to conditions that are “invisible” impairments 
to the outside observer.26 However, the idea of conditions outside of the “mainstream” in this context 
has an evaluative dimension. Unlike “mainstream” disabilities like blindness, deafness, or the effects 
of a spinal cord injury, people with chronic pain or fatigue are often suspected of malingering by em-
ployers, compensation officials, and even physicians.27 This interpretation finds further support in 
the following statement by the Court of Appeal: 
The need for this large employer, and indeed all employers, to take seriously their responsibilities in accommodat-
ing employees with disabilities is very important. This is, if anything, more true for employees whose disabilities 
may be seen by some as outside the mainstream and therefore not genuine.28  
These excerpts reveal the current underlying suspicion that conditions like CFS are dubious. Quite 
possibly the conditions are either not “real” or not very serious.   
Within the medical community itself, we see opinions that suggest CFS can be faked. In Honda, the 
majority quoted Dr. Brennan who referred to the authoritative Centre for Disease Control as developing 
“some strict diagnostic criteria for Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) to aid in its diagnosis and differentia-
tion from depression, fatigue of chronic illness, malingering, multiple rheumatic diseases etc.”29 Because 
of this underlying scepticism, employers are more likely to insist on repeated doctors’ visits to confirm a 
diagnosis or special systems to monitor disability-related absences, as Honda did with Mr. Keays.  
Unfortunately, the same scepticism that motivates employers to impose unduly strenuous monitor-
ing systems on people with non-mainstream disabilities is what allowed the majority to perceive Honda’s 
actions as appropriate, non-discriminatory and to find errors in the trial judge’s findings of fact. The 
judgments indicate that Mr. Keays was seen by at least three doctors before Honda insisted that he see 
Dr. Brennan. Based on his London Life disability benefits, there was little doubt that at least one of those 
doctors had already made the chronic fatigue syndrome diagnosis. In interpreting the March 28 ultima-
tum, the trial judge therefore found that Honda had intimidated Mr. Keays by deliberately misstating and 
misinterpreting whether his file revealed that there had already been a diagnosis of CFS. However, the 
                                                 
 22 The Honda trial judgment refers to a webpage on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website that has 
since been removed. We are using the information currently available on the website. Honda trial, supra note 9 at para. 13.  
 23 U.S. Centers for Disease Control, “Chronic Fatigue Syndrome–Basic Facts”, online: Department of Health and Hu-
man Services: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention <http://www.cdc.gov/cfs/cfsbasicfacts.htm>. 
 24 Ibid. 
 25 Statistics Canada, “Canadian Community Health Survey: Mental health and Well-being” The Daily (3 September 
2003) 2, online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/030903/dq030903-eng.pdf>. 
 26 Honda trial, supra note 9 at para. 53. “Invisible” disability is a common term in disability discourse meaning unseen. 
This is different from the concept of “mainstream,” a word that has other connotations such as “regular” or “acceptable” or 
even “believable.” 
 27 Honda trial, supra note 9 at para. 53.  
 28 Keays v. Honda Canada Inc. (c.o.b. Honda of Canada MFG) (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 161, [2006] O.J. No. 3891 at para. 
65 (C.A.) [Honda Ont. C.A.]. 
 29 Honda, supra note 4 at para. 44 [emphasis added].  
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majority showed no deference to this determination, finding instead that Honda simply conveyed the in-
formation gathered from its experts. The trial judge also found that Dr. Brennan had already decided 
prior to the consultation that the claim by Mr. Keays was “bogus” and that Keays’ referral was a “set up”. 
Again, the majority overturned this finding of fact, finding instead that Dr. Brennan was taking a cautious 
approach, a position endorsed by the medical profession. Finally, the majority did not accept the trial 
judge’s finding that, had the consultation occurred, Dr. Brennan would have taken a “hardball” approach. 
Rather, it held that Dr. Brennan needed to see Keays in order to make his diagnosis according to the 
standards set out by the Centre for Disease Control. While the intemperate language of the trial judge 
may have contributed to the willingness of the Court to disturb the findings of fact, the ambiguous nature 
of the disability paved the way for such interference. If Mr. Keays had a spinal cord injury, readily con-
firmed by X-rays, it is unlikely that the trial judge’s negative perception of Honda’s actions would have 
been considered an error. However, in cases of CFS and other “non-mainstream” conditions, self-
reported data is often the primary source of medical “proof”. In these situations, the credibility of the em-
ployee becomes central to the case. By looking at the majority’s conclusions, it is clear that most, if not all, 
of Mr. Keays’ evidence was examined through a lens of doubt created by the medical model’s characteri-
zation of “non-mainstream” disabilities.  
Unlike Mr. Keays, Ms. Laverrière had a number of physical conditions that could be confirmed by 
standard medical tests and were consistent with a medical model of disability. However, she also had a 
psychiatric diagnosis, personality disorder, which was particularly problematic. This aspect of Ms. Laver-
rière’s disability was even less mainstream and less compatible with the medical model because of its psy-
chiatric nature. While the Court did not focus on the ambiguities of mental illness in Ms. Laverrière’s cir-
cumstances, but rather her extended absences from work, concepts of mental illness diverge from the 
manner of diagnosis and prognosis usually associated with physical disabilities. Personality disorder 
probably exemplifies the essence of the social construction of disability in which the social environment, 
rather than an individual’s trait, defines the condition. This disability made it difficult for Ms. Laverrière 
to get along with others. When the Union experts recommended that accommodation involve periodic 
change to Ms. Laverrière’s environment, they were predicting an ongoing inability to get along with other 
people. From a medical perspective, neither drugs nor psychotherapy provide a remedy for a personality 
disorder. If Ms. Laverrière did return to work, the same problems were likely to occur with a period of 
absenteeism as part of the cycle.  
The medical model that forms the background to these decisions is a blunt, limited view of disability 
and a step backwards from previous disability decisions by the Court. Conditions such as multiple sclero-
sis provide examples of conditions that were not previously considered legitimate for lack of a clear medi-
cal explanation. It was not until a biological basis was discovered that the medical community fully ac-
cepted that persons with this condition were not malingering.30 Increasingly, previously unexplained 
mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, have been determined to have a biochemical basis. That being 
said, the search for a medical explanation of disability is frequently not helpful.  
Activists, policymakers and scholars have argued that the appropriate approach to disability depends 
on context.31 Some types of disability arise from a clear biological impairment accompanied by physical 
signs that can be confirmed by medical tests. Other physical conditions, equally real, cannot be deter-
mined by objective medical assessments but depend on the reported experience of the individual. Disabil-
ity may also be defined on a functional basis which looks at the range of activities that a person can per-
form, an approach which is often most relevant to the question of work. Another approach strongly fa-
voured in critical disability studies, views disability as the product of social attitudes and structures that 
create handicap. In Mercier, the Court itself recognized that a “handicap” may be “the result of a physical 
                                                 
 30 See generally Judith Richman et al., “Feminist Perspectives on the Social Construction of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome” 
(2000) 21 Health Care for Women International 173; P. Moss & K. Teghtsoonian, Contesting Illness Processes and Practice 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); Judy A. Le Page, Grant L. Iverson & Peter Collins, “The impact of judges' per-
ceptions of credibility in fibromyalgia claims” (2008) 31 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 30. 
 31 See e.g. Jerome Bickenbach, Physical Disability and Social Policy (Toronto, University of Toronto Press: 1993) at 
chapters 1-3; See also Dianne Pothier, “Appendix: Legal Developments in the Supreme Court of Canada Regarding Disabil-
ity” in Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin, eds., Critical Disability Theory: Essays in Philosophy, Politics, Policy and Law 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) at 305. 
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limitation, an ailment, a social construct, a perceived limitation or a combination of all of these factors. 
Indeed, it is the combined effect of all these circumstances that determines whether the individual has a 
‘handicap’ for the purposes of the Charter.”32 The reality is that disabilities are not all alike.  
Just because we do not fully understand a disability does not mean that it is not legitimate or se-
rious. Both Mr. Keays and Ms. Laverrière were unable to work as a result of their disabilities. This 
suggests that a functional rather than a biomedical approach to disability would have been much 
more appropriate in both cases. However, a hierarchy of disability supported by a medical model of 
disability was more influential in the analysis. 
2. Specialized Regimes for “Non-Mainstream” Disabilities 
In previous Charter equality and human rights cases, the Supreme Court has dealt with numer-
ous situations in which employees with “non-mainstream” disabilities were subjected to specialized 
schemes in employment-related contexts. In striking down several such schemes, the Court recog-
nized the particular problems, stigma and discrimination that go along with controversial disabili-
ties. This was not the view in Honda. As mentioned above, the specialized system used by Honda to 
monitor Keays’ absences was more onerous than the system used for employees with other disabili-
ties that were more consistent with a medical model. Keays had to provide confirmation from a doc-
tor for every single disability-related absence. The majority did not see Honda’s demands as inap-
propriate. 
In Battlefords and District Co-Operative Ltd. v. Gibbs,33 the Court found that an eligibility crite-
rion for long term disability benefits, that required people with a mental disability as opposed to a 
physical disability to be institutionalized, was discriminatory. This decision recognized that persons 
with mental disabilities have suffered a particular disadvantage, a conclusion echoed by the Court in 
other decisions.34 In Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin,35 the Court found that 
a separate regime for workers with chronic pain, under Nova Scotia’s Workers’ Compensation Act 
and the Functional Restoration Program Regulations, violated section 15 of the Charter and was not 
a reasonable limit under section 1. By legislating separate benefits, argued to be uniquely tailored to 
chronic pain, “far from dispelling the negative assumptions about chronic pain sufferers, the scheme 
actually reinforces them by sending the message that this condition is not ‘real.’ ... This message 
clearly indicates that, in the Nova Scotia legislature’s eyes, chronic pain sufferers are not equally val-
ued as members of Canadian society.”36  
Both Gibbs and Martin, however, occurred in contexts different from the present cases. In those 
cases, the primary focus was access to insurance benefits that flowed from employment rather than 
employment itself. The Court did not need to contemplate what was necessary for Gibbs or Martin to 
remain in the workplace with their disabilities. Rather, the question concerned the fairness of the 
employment insurance scheme that came into effect after the decision had been made that the dis-
abled employees should not work either temporarily or permanently. In the past, a decent level of 
economic support outside the workplace was the best people with disabilities could hope for. In the 
present cases, the plaintiffs wanted to continue working.  
Even in the context of employment-related benefits, the Court has not consistently recognized 
the unique difficulties associated with common disabling conditions when these conditions do not fit 
a neat medical model. In Granovsky,37 by way of contrast to Martin and Gibbs, the court did not find 
discrimination. Mr. Granovsky claimed disability benefits because of a back condition.38 However, 
                                                 
 32 Québec (Commission des droits de la personne & des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City), 2000 SCC 27, [2000] 
1 S.C.R. 665, [2000] S.C.J. No. 24 at para. 79 [Mercier]. 
 33 Battlefords and District Co-operative Ltd. v. Gibbs, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 566, [1996] S.C.J. No. 55. 
 34 See Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, [1999] S.C.J. No. 31; 
R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32. 
 35 Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, 2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504. 
 36 Ibid. at para. 105. 
 37 Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 2000 SCC 28, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703. 
 38 Ibid. at para. 4. 
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the effects of Mr. Granovsky’s chronic, deteriorating and intermittent back condition had prevented 
him from accumulating the 10 year continuous work pattern that would qualify him for Canada Pen-
sion Plan Disability Benefits.39 While the scheme made available certain “drop-out” provisions, un-
der which periods of disability were not counted in the recency of contribution calculation, Mr. 
Granovsky’s deteriorating back problem did not qualify as a severe and permanent disability, making 
him ineligible for these exemptions.40 The Court found that there was no disability discrimination in 
Mr. Granovsky’s case even though it was his disability that produced his sporadic work pattern and, 
therefore, his disability that disqualified him from receiving benefits. The Court concluded that those 
who experience temporary disabilities are “better off” than those with pre-existing disabilities. Again, 
as in Honda, we see the emergence of a hierarchy of legitimacy in which some disabilities are consid-
ered more legitimate, more worthy or more real than others.41  
B. The Duty to Accommodate and Undue Hardship in the Context of Employment Law and La-
bour Law 
One of the most significant questions arising from these decisions is whether the burden on the 
employer to prove undue hardship has been relaxed from the high standard set out in Meiorin. Un-
fortunately, the cases do not provide a straightforward answer. Rather, the Court chose to prioritize 
the principles of contract law, both in the context of employment law in Honda and in labour law in 
Hydro-Québec.  
In both cases, the Court failed to provide real guidance regarding the point at which the accom-
modation of disability-related absenteeism becomes undue hardship, a difficult issue both in princi-
ple and in practice. The leading cases on undue hardship hold that the burden rests on the employer 
to prove undue hardship as the limit on the duty to accommodate. An employer is expected to be 
“conscientious”,42 “serious”,43 and “genuine”44 in its efforts to accommodate. Common workplace 
accommodations for individuals with disabilities include modified or reduced hours or days, special 
chairs or back supports, job redesigns, and modified or ergonomic workstations.45 The exact mean-
ing of undue hardship varies with the circumstances and has always been heavily dependent on the 
nature of the employer’s operation and the plaintiff’s employment. Factors that may be considered 
when assessing the undue hardship limit include “financial cost, disruption of a collective agreement, 
problems of morale of other employees, [and] interchangeability of work force and facilities.”46  An 
alleged hardship must be undue, meaning more than a mere nuisance or inconvenience to the em-
ployer. In Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, the Court said: 
More than mere negligible effort is required to satisfy the duty to accommodate. The use of the term ‘undue’ infers 
that some hardship is acceptable; it is only ‘undue’ hardship that satisfies this test. … Minor interference or incon-
venience is the price to be paid for religious freedom in a multicultural society.47 
While Renaud was a case about religious accommodation, the Court made it clear that broad social goals 
require that undue hardship mean more than minor inconvenience.48 This would certainly pertain to the 
inclusion of people with disabilities, especially given their underrepresentation in the workforce. 
Despite the elevated position the Court has previously granted to human rights obligations, the 
Court did not underscore their paramountcy in these cases. Because human rights law serves to protect 
                                                 
 39 Ibid. at para. 5. 
 40 Ibid. at para. 8.  
 41 See Fiona Sampson’s case comment on this point. Fiona Sampson, “Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration): adding insult to injury?” (2005) 17 C.J.W.L. 71. 
 42 C.U.P.W. v. Canada Post Corp., 1997 CarswellNat 1864 at para. 49 (Canada Arbitration Board) (WLeC). 
 43 Krznaric v. Chevrette (1997), 154 D.L.R. (4th) 527 at 547, [1997] O.J. No. 4712, at para. 86 (Ont. C.J.). 
 44 Holmes v Canada (Attorney General) (1997), (1998) 130 F.T.R. 251, [1997] F.C.J. No. 577 at para. 34. 
 45 PALS 2006, supra note 7 at 18. 
 46 Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489 at 521, [1990] S.C.J. No. 80 
at para. 62. 
 47 Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 at 984-85, [1992] S.C.J. No. 75 at para. 19, 
20 [Renaud]. 
 48 Ibid. 
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our most important values, human rights considerations are central to interpreting any piece of legisla-
tion, common law rule or contract.49 Human rights law has a special nature that is “not quite constitu-
tional but certainly more than the ordinary ... ”50 However, there is no indication that the majority 
viewed human rights in this broad social sense, reflected in Renaud or Meiorin. Rather, it was the es-
sence of the private employment contract that was pivotal.  
1. Disability Discrimination and Unjust Dismissal 
In Honda, the approach of the Court was to separate completely the human rights analysis from 
an examination of whether the employment contract was breached. According to the majority, the 
Human Rights Code is a complete and self-contained system. “Thus, a person who alleges a breach of 
the provisions of the Code must seek a remedy within the statutory scheme set out in the Code it-
self.”51  The overall effect of the decision is somewhat contradictory. Although the Court upheld the 
finding that Mr. Keays was unjustly dismissed, the majority strongly defended the conduct of Honda, 
largely by rejecting an analysis that would include discrimination.  
In the context of unjust dismissal, the majority in Honda never used the critical concepts of the 
duty to accommodate or the undue hardship limit. Instead of recognizing that disability discrimina-
tion was at issue in ordering Mr. Keays to see the company doctor, the case was framed as a matter of 
insubordination because Mr. Keays refused to do so. Human rights were addressed in a very limited 
way, only to determine whether discrimination could be a factor in the calculation of damages. Sys-
tematically, the majority eliminated even that possibility. As mentioned above in this comment, the 
majority found errors in a great number of facts found at trial, many of which had suggested dis-
crimination upon which damages for manner of dismissal or punitive damages could rest.52 Without 
this factual foundation, there was no evidence to support a finding of discrimination. Additionally, 
however, the majority seemed to support the proposition that since Bhadauria established that dis-
crimination was not an independent tort,53 discrimination could not, in law, constitute an independ-
ent actionable wrong on which to base punitive damages.54 In contrast to the finding of the trial 
judge that the monitoring system for Mr. Keays’ absences due to his “non-mainstream” disability was 
itself discriminatory, the majority found this system to be itself an accommodation, beneficial to Mr. 
Keays in the circumstances.55 Monitoring regular absenteeism went to the very nature of the em-
ployment contract.56 While the dissent agreed that management had the right to monitor absences, it 
cautioned against assuming all methods were equally non-discriminatory.57  
The failure to incorporate human rights obligations in a case of employment law involving dis-
ability is extremely problematic. Human rights tribunals had developed an extensive body of law on 
the right to accommodation for disabilities.58 As demonstrated by Honda, however, this seemed to 
have little effect on this case. Human rights obligations should be viewed as implied terms of any 
employment contract. Implied terms have long been a part of the law of contract, and include the 
right to reasonable notice upon termination, the implied term at issue in Honda. In Parry Sound,59 
                                                 
 49 Some light may be shed by misconduct cases involving employees with addictions in the labour law context. These 
decisions distinguish between culpable voluntary behaviour, non-culpable non-voluntary behaviour and hybrid misconduct. 
Where misconduct is non-culpable or hybrid, as in the cases of Mr. Keays and Ms. Laverrière, a human rights analysis is 
certainly required. See Health Employers Assn. of B.C. (Kootenay Boundary Regional Hospital) v. B.C. Nurses’ Union, 
2006 BCCA 57, [2006] 54 B.C.L.R. (4th) 113 ; Fraser Lake Sawmills Ltd. (Re), [2002] B.C.L.R.B.D. no. 390 (British Colum-
bia Labour Relations Board). 
 50 Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at 547. 
 51 Honda, supra note 4 at para. 63. 
 52 See Honda, supra note 4 at para. 62; Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595 at para. 82. 
 53 Bhadauria, supra note 15. 
 54 Honda, supra note 4 at para. 64. 
 55 Ibid. at para. 67.  
 56 Ibid. at para. 71.  
 57 Ibid. at para. 121.  
 58 See generally Michael Lynk, Disability and the Duty to Accommodate in the Canadian Workplace, online: Ontario 
Federation of Labour <http://www.ofl.ca/uploads/library/disability_issues/ACCOMMODATION.pdf>. 
 59 Parry Sound (District) Welfare Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, 2003 SCC 4, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157 
[Parry Sound]. 
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the Court gave jurisdiction to arbitrators to decide human rights issues and held that the substantive 
rights and obligations of the Ontario Human Rights Code were incorporated into collective agree-
ments. As Iacobucci J. for the majority stated: “[H]uman rights and other employment-related stat-
utes establish a floor beneath which an employer and a union cannot contract.”60 There is no justifi-
cation for restricting this principle to unionized employees. Obligations in the employment contract 
simply cannot be considered apart from human rights obligations.  
LeBel J., speaking for the dissent in Honda, recognized that even damages for the breach of an 
employment contract must be considered in view of the values of human rights codes and the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These considerations should not represent a separate or sec-
ondary inquiry but should be combined into one integrated inquiry.  LeBel J.’s analysis exemplified 
this integrated approach. For instance, the dissent acknowledged that, while monitoring absences of 
disabled employees is a valid objective for any employer, it should not be assumed that all methods 
are acceptable and non-discriminatory. LeBel J. also recognized that sending Mr. Keays to Dr. Bren-
nan, in view of his perspective on “non-mainstream” conditions, was intended to serve the interests 
of the employer rather than to promote inclusivity in the workplace. He said: 
Dr. Brennan’s objective is to recommend the “accommodation” that is best for Honda, not the one that is best for 
the employee. Although he suggests that he is only giving a “medical” opinion, his opinion is focussed on maximiz-
ing an employee’s productivity for Honda in light of the employee’s condition. His goal is clearly not to find ways 
for Honda to make it easier for the employee to do his or her current job.61 
2. Undue Hardship and the Fundamental Nature of the Employment Contract 
By way of contrast, the Court in Hydro-Québec claimed that it was dealing squarely with the hu-
man rights analysis by refining the phrase “impossible to accommodate”, taken from Meiorin. Never-
theless, the decision rested ultimately on the employment contract. Hydro-Québec was a grievance 
decided in the context of labour relations arbitration, where the collective agreement is the central 
concern of both parties. In this context, the principles of longstanding importance to the parties, 
such as management rights for the employer and seniority for the union, may take precedence over 
the creation of an inclusive work environment.62 Unlike the mandate of human rights tribunals, 
where the promotion of diversity, dignity, and inclusion form the raison d’être of the decision-
making process, arbitrators are concerned with the interpretation of a collective agreement with a 
background of an ongoing relationship between the parties. 
In Hydro-Québec, the Court described the goal of accommodation as ensuring that “an employee 
who is able to work can do so”63 or, more specifically, that those who are “otherwise fit to work are 
not unfairly excluded where working conditions can be adjusted without undue hardship.” In setting 
out the undue hardship limit, the Court pointed to the fundamental nature of the employment con-
tract as the exchange of labour for wages. Since Ms. Laverrière failed to meet these basic obligations, 
even after significant attempts at accommodation, the employer had shown that it was impossible to 
accommodate her without incurring undue hardship. Adopting the words of Thibault J. in Québec 
(Procureur général) v. Syndicat des professionnelles et professionnels du gouvernement du Québec 
(SPGQ) the Court stated that “it is less the employee’s handicap that forms the basis of the dismissal 
than his or her inability to fulfill the fundamental obligations arising from the employment relation-
ship.”64  
One interpretation of this decision is that the fundamental terms of an employment contract now 
make up the standard for undue hardship. Another related possibility is that the terms of the em-
ployment contract help interpret the undue hardship limit. This is similar to the approach taken in 
                                                 
 60 Ibid. at para. 28. 
 61 Honda, supra note 4 at para. 100. 
 62 Of course, this criticism does not apply to the human rights decisions of all arbitrations. In fact, Meiorin, supra 
note 1, was decided by an arbitrator in the first instance. 
 63 Hydro-Québec, supra note 5 at para. 14. 
 64 Ibid. at para. 18 citing approvingly and translating from Québec (Procureur général) c. Syndicat des professionnelles 
et professionnels du gouvernement du Québec (SPGQ), 2005 QCCA 311, 2005 R.J.Q 944 at para. 76. 
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McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital 
général de Montréal65 where the collective agreement specified the period when dismissal could fol-
low after a lengthy absence. Because the parties to a collective agreement are knowledgeable about 
the enterprise and the workforce, such a term is useful, but not definitive. The majority held that a 
provision in a collective agreement should be one factor in determining whether the employer had 
satisfied the duty to accommodate, but this could not substitute for a case by case analysis.66 
In Hydro-Québec the Court explicitly drew the connection between undue hardship and the fun-
damental terms of the contract in the context of chronic absenteeism. Deschamps J. said: 
In a case involving chronic absenteeism, if the employer shows that, despite measures taken to accommodate the 
employee, the employee will be unable to resume his or her work in the reasonably foreseeable future, the em-
ployer will have discharged its burden of proof and established undue hardship.67 
Here the Court was quite clear that the duty to accommodate did not go so far as requiring that the 
fundamental nature of the employment contract be altered. That is, the employer is entitled to some 
benefit for the wages paid to the employee. Although this general principle may be correct, it leads to a 
number of thorny questions. Does this elision of undue hardship with the fundamental nature of the 
employment contract apply only to absenteeism? What is the minimum obligation of the employee to 
“perform work” as per the employment bargain? Is it enough for an employee to merely show up at his 
or her place of work? How frequent must his or her attendance be? Can employers claim that a funda-
mental term of the contract is the production of a certain number of widgets? These questions are par-
ticularly pertinent to employees with disabilities and raise the question of whether the fundamental na-
ture of the employment contract is itself subject to accommodation. 
The decision in Hydro-Québec reflects the idea that an employer should not be required to bear the 
cost of an employee from which there is no benefit at all to the enterprise. In my view, this principle is 
correct. However, it is important to recognize that this case still sets a very high standard for the undue 
hardship limit. The extreme nature of the facts here must be underscored. Ms. Laverrière had not been 
at work for many months and was not expected to return in the foreseeable future. Over several years 
the employer had undertaken significant measures to accommodate Ms. Laverrière, going so far as the 
creation of a new job for her after corporate restructuring. While there was some difference of opinion 
among experts, it was clear that certain issues, such as the stresses within Ms. Laverrière’s family that 
contributed to her absenteeism, were completely outside the control of the employer. Thus, the limit 
described here is met where an employee is absent, does not perform any work at all for a protracted 
period of time, and expects no change in the foreseeable future despite extensive efforts at accommoda-
tion.  
While the undue hardship limit here may be appropriate on these facts, it reveals an important pol-
icy consideration given the drastic statistics concerning people with disabilities and employment. While 
private employers should not shoulder the entire cost when the requirements for accommodation are 
extreme, persons with disabilities who want to work should have the opportunity to do so. Rather, 
there should be a shared responsibility between both the public and private sectors. For everyone, the 
significance of employment is multi-faceted, with dimensions of economic security, personal satisfac-
tion and social validation. For this reason, the spirit of anti-discrimination law should require extensive 
public support for employers to hire and retain employees with disabilities in such circumstances.68  
                                                 
 65 McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de 
Montréal, 2007 SCC 4, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 161, [2007] S.C.J. No. 4. 
 66 Ibid. at para. 20. As the majority explains: 
The period negotiated by the parties is therefore a factor to consider when assessing the duty of reasonable ac-
commodation. Such clauses do not definitively determine the specific accommodation measure to which an 
employee is entitled, since each case must be evaluated on the basis of its particular circumstances. 
 67 Hydro-Québec, supra note 5 at para. 17. 
 68 It is beyond the scope of this comment to outline the possibilities, but these could include wage subsidies to employ-
ers, a taxation system or an externally funded service to the employer community 
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CONCLUSION 
In many ways, Meiorin was an easy case. Tawney Meiorin was a female forest firefighter who had 
worked at her job competently and without incident. The case dealt with formal equality in that it 
revolved around the exclusionary effect of a fitness standard that was set for all employees regardless 
of gender. But for the rule that excluded the complainant as a result of a physical fitness standard 
developed for men, Meiorin had demonstrated that she was perfectly proficient at her job. Only an 
arbitrary standard was the obstacle. The remedy did not require any change in the job description or 
re-organization of the workplace. The only change necessary was a revision of the standard, a change 
that caused no disruption and incurred absolutely no cost to the employer.  
At best, the decisions in Honda and Hydro-Québec suggest that the Court has failed to clarify 
how the Meiorin vision applies to disability cases in employment. Outside of the specialized human 
rights decision-making process, the Court has marginalized the human rights dimensions of a 
wrongful dismissal action and left unanswered critical questions in the interpretation of a collective 
agreement. The Court has confounded undue hardship with the fundamental principles in an em-
ployment contract without having considered fully the nature of the contract in the disability context. 
At worst, the cases suggest that an employer needs to pay little attention to accommodating employ-
ees with disabilities if it is too difficult. This is especially true if the disability arises from a condition 
that is non-specific, difficult to treat, or where there is poor foreseeability regarding prognosis. Fur-
ther, employers can require endless confirmations of disability even when these run roughshod over 
the individual employee. Medical expertise can be used to legitimate the exclusionary agenda of the 
employer. This was not the Meiorin vision of an inclusive workplace.  
 
